### Case

Framing the alternative as a “moral obligation” makes violence inevitable

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This brings us to our final, and probably most difficult, issue which concerns the ‘authenticity’ of revolution (or the ‘metric’ Sheard alludes to). Can we really organize for revolution? Not in any active sense. Revolution should not be turned into a moral obligation, into something we ought to do while we fight the inertia of the present; the latter being a position that is shared by both peddlers of management fantasies and earnest ‘lefties’. In the terms of Bernard Williams’s distinction between ‘ought’ and ‘must’, an authentic revolution is by definition something that emerges as a ‘must’ or an urge, an ‘I can do no other’ (cf. Zˇizˇek 2006). In this respect it is worth quoting Sartre (1976) at some length from his magisterial analysis of the French revolution (in the Critique of Dialectical Reason, especially pages 306–445). Examining a pivotal moment in the revolution, the storming of the Bastille, he suggests: This revolutionary response to a constantly deteriorating situation has of course the historical significance of an organized common action. But that is just what it was not. It was a collective action: everyone was forced to arm himself by others’ attempts to find arms, and everyone tried to get there before the Others because, in the context of this new scarcity, everyone’s attempt to get a rifle became for the Others the risk of remaining unarmed... Here again, their unity was elsewhere, that is, it was both past and future. It was past in that the group had performed an action and that the collective had recognized this action with surprise as a moment of its own passive activity: it had been a group – and this group defined itself by a revolutionary action which made the process irreversible. And it was future in that the weapons themselves, in so far as they had been taken for the sake of opposing concerted action by soldiers, suggested in their very materiality the possibility of concerted resistance (354–5). Thus revolution always contains a peculiar mixture of contingency and inevitability. Sartre also alludes in the above quote to the fact that the danger of death and violence are integral to the explosion of revolt; or to quote Fairhead out of context: ‘it is just such violence that is the ultimate guarantor of all types of revolt against reality.’ Every authentic revolutionary explosion has to contain an element of ‘pure’ violence. A ‘velvet’ revolution is always-already a contradiction in terms. We are reminded here of Robespierre’s chilling question, ‘destined to reverberate down the centuries after him: “Citizens, do you want a revolution without a revolution”?’ (Scurr 2006, 216). Robespierre believed violence indispensable for advancing the political experiment on which he had staked his life. The very same rights sought and promised by the revolution could also be suspended, if necessary, in the revolution’s cause. To quote Sartre (1976) one last time: The only contradiction between the characteristics which are so often opposed to one another by reactionary writers – Hope and Terror, sovereign Freedom in everyone and Violence against the Other, both outside and inside the group is a dialectical one. And indeed, these are the essential structures of a revolutionary group... And it will be easy to show that these supposedly incompatible characteristics are indissolubly and synthetically united in every action and declaration of the revolutionary demonstrators (406–7) Perhaps software maker Oracle got it right after all when they ran a commercial during the 1998 American Super Bowl comparing themselves to the Khmer Rouge, who were shown herding refugees before them and firing their AK47s as they ushered in the (business) revolution (cf. Frank 2001, 173)?

Aff reenchants policymaking and is prerequisite to framework by opening space for alternatives to falsely universal solutions.

Parsons, ‘10 [Wayne Parson is Professor of Public Policy at Queen Mary, University of London. He is currently Visiting Professor in policy sciences at FLACSO, Mexico and the Catholic University of Lille; “Modernism redux: po-mo problems and hi-mo public policy” from “Public Management in the Postmodern Era: Challenges and Prospects”; 2010]

The shift towards the discourse of policy capacity involved therefore using the (best) bits of earlier (technocratic and managerialist) discourse (1960s hits), and re- packing them as ‘modernization’ and building policy/ governance capacities. Dror’s report to the Club of Rome, The Capacity to Govern, is redolent of a musty old technocratic ethos which was itself a remix of the kind of arguments he had put forward (in Public Policymaking Reexamined, 1968) before Neil Armstrong took that one small step: if government was going to solve problems, it had to get a lot smarter! Fast forward to the 1990s and the obsession with the challenge of ‘governance’ and ‘hollowed out states’ and the need for policy makers to improve their network steering capacities, and the solution for Dror was the same, except more so: plus ça change. The more complex problems became, the more government had to reassert its capacity to steer and navigate. In a similar vein, the World Bank, which had, from the beginning, a dominant role in the production of policy analysis, launched its remix: ‘we are the Knowledge Bank’ (‘things can only get better’) in 1996. No longer was the Bank just in the business of lending money and telling countries what to do: it mutated into a Bank that liked to share knowledge and build in- country analytical capacity. It was the Bank that was in the business of ‘technical guidance’. The plan was for the Bank to (apparently) vacate the driving seat but still provide the maps. It was still doing the navigating. And, at a time when academic students of public policy were warning about the dangers of thinking of policy making as a set of rational stages (Sabatier, 1999), HM government was using the rational model as the basis of creating a more ‘professional’ approach to policy making by remixing the policy stages model with a good dose of ye olde strategic management (Parsons, 2001). One could argue that the high- modernism remix of the Bank, in Dror and in HM government, was symptomatic of the remixing going on elsewhere from the mid- 1990s onwards. As politics was becoming more ‘non- ideological’ and ‘what matters is what works’ became the mantra of the modernizing faith, the policy process and policy analysis could be portrayed as essentially technical and managerial in orientation. In the absence of political or ideological grand narratives, the high- modernism of policy analysis became a kind of default setting: a ‘we don’t have an ideological agenda, we are just interested in what works, sharing knowledge and policy skills training’ grand narrative. In this case, we might read the high- modernism manifested in the 1990s as the product of the ‘end of ideology’ and a world without grand narratives. The big idea was that there was no big idea: ‘evidence’ should drive policy, and techniques and tools and models would improve the problem solving capacity of both the developed and developing world. Indeed, the 1990s remix was in many ways far more technocratic than discussed in Trevor Smith’s account of the 1960s and early 1970s. To govern was to design targets and specify outcomes and results and to manage, monitor and evaluate (even risk) so as to realize these targets. Thus it came to pass that a postmodern world was to give rise to high- modern modes of policy making and analysis. Highmodernism in public policy was just another postmodern remix of a sort: an exercise in self- referencing and technocratic bricolage. Perhaps the whole concept of ‘postmodern’, however, is not helpful when we come to think about alternatives to the kind of modernism we have experienced since the 1990s. It is possible to say that postmodernist describes the present human condition, but it does not take us far when we have to think in terms of what to do about health, housing, education, the economy, and so on. It may provide us with an account of the policy process, but it hardly seems relevant for thinking about how can we design policies. A postmodern policy – as a theory of a problem and, heaven forbid, a grand narrative – seems a contradiction in terms. Postmodernism can do a good job of deconstructing the world but appears to rule out constructing an alternative. The postmodern rejection of theory logically also rules out the idea of a ‘policy’ and ‘analysis’. If there is no privileged reading of a text and voice, and uncertainty is all in all, what then? It is a grand narrative that prohibits any other grand narrative. Do postmodern tools, therefore, have any place in the professional policy maker’s toolbox? On the face of it, no: but that may be the professional policy maker’s loss. What is lacking in the existing box of delights provided by the BWIs and others is a critical disposition: a way of looking at problems as constructed discourses, which serve to lock today’s problems in yesterday’s language. Deconstruction can challenge the assumptions and the mindset embedded in a policy language (Schram, 1993). As such it can be used, so it is argued, to help practitioners better understand the arguments they use and the alternatives to existing policy designs (Gillroy, 1997; Miller, 2002). Postmodern approaches have much to offer modern policy designers: above all they bring to the fore the importance of playfulness in the design process. Policy analysis as art and craft has been seen as the sole preserve of the species homo sapiens, but perhaps critical approaches also need to give homo ludens a try. Policy analysis in a wicked world has to deal (above all) with paradox, a world in which solutions do not exist, and in which meaning is not so obvious or so available or so desirable; a world in which we do not possess the luxury of a single perspective but have to deal with problems as existing within a multiplicity of ways of understanding [sic]. Playfulness requires an analysis of problems which recognizes the role of diff erent forms and kinds of knowledge. Like the fool, homo ludens should be licensed to poke fun and prick the bubbles of the powerful as they float around the corridors of power. The postmodern deconstructive tools in the box are the pig’s bladder and the motley: the tools of the fool. In this sense, policy analysis requires the same kind of playfulness that is a vital aspect of all human problem solving and design. Postmodern foolishness, above all, can serve to create space in which innovation (and a more critical modernity) can emerge. The postmodern fool plays the part that all the very best fools have played at the courts of the mighty: opening up space by challenging the supposed wisdom of the powerful, replacing clarity and dogma with ambiguity and doubt through verbal dexterity and ‘wit’. This opening up of policy space to ambiguity is especially important in the light of Wildavsky’s argument that, over time, the policy space becomes ever more dense and crowded: policies overlap and bump into one another and policies end up their own cause. Postmodernism can create space by questioning the fundamental (modernist) assumptions which support the architecture of policies and institutions: it does not presume to ‘speak truth to power’ but it interrogates and pricks that which is regarded as truth. The jester does this by being an outsider on the inside. The fool possesses the skill of being the outsider, the one whose cunning wit questions meaning and opens up the spaces between the words. As Hugh Miller shows, it can lampoon the contradictions and stupidities of supposedly neutral and objective forms of instrumental rationality that are embodied in bureaucracy and managerialism, and thereby expose solutions as little more than ‘bumper sticker’ slogans (Miller, 2002). So, ‘Vesti la giubba’ since postmodern motley is appropriate attire for the high- modern court: a court that is always at risk of believing in the power of rationality and its capacity for intellectual cogitation and is consequently invariably prey to taking itself seriously, self- deception, closedmindedness and groupthink. Postmodern analysis is the joker in the pack, the wild card that does not belong: the post modern analyst is neither a Jack, Queen or King, or a member of any suit in the pack. As such, postmodern policy analysis requires a very diff erent ‘skill set’ for professional policy makers than those which are generally deemed necessary. The postmodern fool may serve to create a more playful context for policy making: and in doing so it does not ‘postmodernise’ public policy per se, but may well contribute to its reenchantment. A reenchanted public policy would be less ‘post’ modern than a more critical, knowing and playful form of modernism.3 It was Max Weber who argued that the fate of our modern times was characterized by ‘rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the disenchantment of the world’ (Weber, 1991a: 155). This ‘entzauberung der Welt’ would, as a result of the spread of ‘rational, empirical knowledge’, transform the world into little more than a ‘causal mechanism’ (Weber, 1991b: 350–51). The modern world was, he gloomily forecast, doomed to be driven by the engine of disenchanted rationalization ‘until the last ton of fossilised coal was burnt’ (Weber, 1976: 181). Until then, ‘not summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a night of icy darkness and hardness’ (Weber, 1991c: 128). The new high priests of this dark, hard age would be the scientists, economists, bureaucrats, and all those whose claim to power was grounded in their claims to knowledge and technical expertise. A brief read through some of the recent outputs of the BWIs graphically illustrates that, if we ever doubted it, we still live in the realms of entzauberung, where the only knowledge or wisdom that counts is that possessed by those who do the counting and write the ‘guides’ and compile the toolboxes: a world in which rational analytical knowledge and bureaucratic hierarchy always triumph over local and more tacit forms of practical wisdom and where the loud and strident ‘grand narratives’ of the powerful all too often crowd out and shout down the stories told around the camp fires that warm the hard icy darkness. Well, the day when the last ton of fossil fuel is used up is not so far off : in which case, it is valid to ask what kinds of roads might lead to the warmer, sunlit and soft lands of neuverzauberung4 or ‘reenchantment’? The reenchantment of public policy begins when we recognize that the problems we face are of a wicked nature: they do not have ‘solutions’ which can be arrived at purely through the exercise of reason and analysis. We face problems for which causal relationships are so complex that we cannot know when one problem ends and another begins, or whether the problems themselves have been caused by previous or existing policies. We confront a world in which ‘what works?’ is a simplistic and non sensical question. ‘What works?’, like probability, is a poor guide to action in a world in which ‘problems’ are not continuous over time and space. The fact that a policy had worked in one context does not mean that it will work in another. In the land of neuverzauberung causes and eff ects, and means and ends, are complex and confusing. We realize that we have to design solutions even though we can know so very little. It is a world in which students and practitioners have to become more modest about their capacities to (as Lindblom put it) ‘understand and shape society’. A reenchanted policy space is therefore a domain lacking the most powerful of modernist myths: there are, alas, no ‘zauberkugel’ – magic bullets – in the land of neuverzauberung. It is policy making that lays no claim to have magic bullets, silver or otherwise, which can be used in policy wars to hit targets.5 Just as there are no magic bullets for cancer or obesity or any other bodily ailment, in a reenchanted policy space we have to come to terms with the fact that there are no magic bullets for our ‘public’ ailments. One size does not fit all. The ‘policy’ as universal solution is recognized for what it is: the ubiquitous snake oil of modern political discourse. On reflection, the landscape of neuverzauberung in many ways off ers a very postmodern prospect: it is confusing and complex, and full of competing ideas of what counts as progress in theory and practice. Policy studies itself has always been a field with no defined boundaries or borders. It consequently has a topography which has been formed by the transgression of intellectual boundaries. Indeed, the mission of the policy sciences movement was (in Lasswell’s terms) to integrate knowledge. So, although the policy approach challenges disciplinary boundaries (like postmodernism) it does so in the belief that human knowledge could and should be integrated so as to solve human problems (so very non- postmodern). Hence, as Wildavsky (1987) observed, policy analysis has ‘expropriated lands’ from many disciplines, and for this reason any attempt to plot where the approach is (or is going) in a cartographic sense will ‘not take us very far’. In fact, in many respects, the policy approach is rather like Schumpeter’s defi nition of economics as being an ‘agglomeration of ill- coordinated and overlapping fi elds of research’, in which the frontiers of the field are ‘incessantly shifting’ (Schumpeter, 1954: 10). Policy analysis as an art and craft requires a variety of tools: most of which are ‘borrowed’. Given this, we should expect a reenchanted public policy to be far more diverse, if not downright eclectic and positively kleptic. If we understand public policy as an ‘agglomeration of ill- coordinated and overlapping fi elds’ which focuses on how human beings design problems and solutions to those conditions they consider to be public, then the toolbox must perforce contain a diverse range of approaches to be of any use to either students or practitioners. Progress in the past was very much about the search for a grand theory, the big idea. But the integration of knowledge relevant to analysis of the policy process, and for and in the process, cannot and should not be understood as an attempt at unification – or positivistic consilience (Wilson, 1998). In which case, progress in public policy may best be viewed as about increasing diversity and competition between different approaches, frameworks, tools and models.

### 2AC Queer Theory

Status quo defines sexuality of terrorist as justification for state sanctioned torture – the aff’s criticism of rhetorical deployment of war provides space for queer identification of the terrorist.

Jasbir K. Puar, 2008. (professor of women's and gender studies at Rutgers University). “Feminists and Queers in the service of empire.” From Feminism and War: Confronting US Imperialism by Chandra Mohanty. P. 47-48

One mapping of the folding of homosexuals into the reproductive valorization of living - technologies of life - includes the contemporary emergence of 'sexually exceptional' US citizens, both heterosexual and otherwise, a formation I term 'US sexual exceptionalism.’ Exceptionalism paradoxically signals distinction from (to be unlike, dissimilar) as well as excellence (eminence, superiority), suggesting a departure from and mastery of linear teleologies of progress. Exception refers both to particular discourses that repetitively produce the USA as an exceptional nation-state and Giorgio Agamben's theorization of the sanctioned and naturalized disregard of the limits of state juridical and political power through times of state crisis, a 'state of exception' that is used to justify the extreme measures of the state (Agamben 2005).This double play of exception speaks to Muslim and Sikh 'terrorist' corporealities as well as to homosexual patriots. The 'sexual torture scandal' at Abu Ghraib, the US military prison in Baghdad, is an instructive example of the interplay between exception and exceptionalism whereby the deferred death of one population recedes as the securitization and valorization of the life of another population triumphs in its shadow. This double deployment of exception and exceptionalism works to turn the negative valence of torture into the positive register of the valorization of (American) life; that is, torture in the name of the maximization and optimalization of life. As the US nation-state produces narratives of exception through the war on terror, it must temporarily suspend its hetero-normative imagined community to consolidate national sentiment and consensus through the recognition and incorporation of some - though not all or most - homosexual subjects. The fantasy of the permanence of this suspension is what drives the production of exceptionalism, a narrative that is historically and politically wedded to the formation of the US nation-state. Thus, the exception and the exceptional work in tandem; the state of exception haunts the proliferation of exceptional national subjects, in a similar vein to the Derridean hauntology in which the ghosts, the absent presences, infuse ontology with a difference (Derrida 1994). Through the transnational production of terrorist corporealities, homosexual subjects who have limited legal rights within the US civil context gain significant representational currency when situated within the global scene of the war on terror. Taking the position that heterosexuality is a necessary constitutive factor of national identity, the 'outlaw' status of homosexual subjects in relation to the state has been a long-standing theoretical interest of feminist, post-colonial, and queer theorists. The outlaw status is mediated through the rise during the 1980s and 1990s of the gay consumer, pursued by marketers who claimed that childless homosexuals had enormous disposable incomes, as well as through legislative gains in civil rights, such as the widely celebrated 2003 overturning of sodomy laws rendered in the Lawrence and Gamer v. Texas decision. By underscoring circuits of homosexual nationalism, I note that some homosexual subjects are complicit with heterosexual nationalist formations rather than inherently or automatically excluded from or opposed to them. Further, a more pernicious inhabitation of homosexual sexual exceptional/ism occurs through stagings of US nationalism via a praxis of sexual othering, one that exceptionalizes the identities of US homosexualities vis-à-vis orientalist constructions of ‘Muslim sexuality.’ This discourse functions through transnational displacements that suture spaces of cultural citizenship in the USA for homosexual subjects as they concurrently secure US nationalist interests globally. In some instances these narratives are explicit, as in the aftermath of the release of the 'Abu Ghraib photos; where the claims to exceptionalism resonated on many planes for US citizen-subjects: morally, sexually, culturally, ‘patriotically.’This imbrication of American exceptionalism is increasingly marked through or aided by certain homosexual bodies, a formation I term homonationalism, short for homo-normative nationalism.

War metaphor promotes exclusion of femininity and upholds heteronormativity in politics AND the debate space – Bashing back promotes confrontational model of debate.

Knutson, ‘96 [Roxanne L. Knutson is Assoicate Professor in the Department of Communication, Appalachian State University; “Metaphorical Construction: Argument is War”; Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 17 (1996)]

There has been a great deal of research dealing with the rhetorical obstacles faced by women choosing to speak in the public arena (Campbell 1973, 1980, 1985; Lakoff 1975 Siegler and Siegler 1976; Talley, Talley and Peck 1980; Putnam 1982; Foss and Foss 1983 Thome, Krambrae and Henly 1983; Fitzpatrick 1983; Edelsky 1983; Mitchell 1984; Japp 1985, Pearson 1985; Bellrichard 1986; Spitzack and Carter 1987; Crowdes 1990). Women taking the debate podium are faced with these obstacles regardless of the exclusive nature of the metaphor discussed above. Summarizing the work of these scholars and others, "male speech is the standard against which female or 'other' speech is judged" and "female difference is comprehensible and judged to be deficient within the context of male communication behavior" (Spitzak and Carter 1987, p. 409). Further, cultural stereotypes which are still very much a part of our social construction, place women squarely in what feminist research calls "the female bind". Women are expected to speak from the podium in a manner that reflects the culture's understanding of their "natural" roles while meeting the standards of power and effectiveness exemplified by male communication norms Pearson ends nearly every chapter in Gender and Communication by suggesting that women and men need to blend aspects of male and female communication styles, meaning that females must alter their communication considerably if they hope to achieve competence in social and political situations (Spitzak and Carter 1987, p. 421). The degree to which this is possible is limited not by a particular woman's self-assessment, but certainly by the external judgments of others in the current cultural context. A woman taking the public podium (thus the debate podium) to discuss issues of public policy is still considered one who is stepping out of her "natural" setting and asserting herself in an area where her voice is one of a minority of voices representing a "special interest". Crowdes speaks to this issue in the following: In dominant rhetoric and everyday relations a woman is perceived to be competent when she conforms to the prescribed gender-specific standards of speech and action. When it is commonly believed that women should be competent at being soft, emotional, unaggressive, available, attentive to the needs and wishes of others (usually men) has been considered appropriate and desirable for women, then competence communicated through physical strength, verbal directness, direct eye contact, confident posture, or independent thinking is frequently perceived as challenging, inappropriate, or incompetent, i.e., unfeminine (Spitzack 1988). (1990, p. 530). It is the contention of this paper that a deeper and more troubling problem for the woman who accepts the challenge of academic debating is the metaphoric construction underlying the activity itself. If we experientially define argumentation and debate as engagement in "war" we further complicate the rhetorical task to such a degree that few women will find acceptance, reward or success in participation. Social mores about the appropriate roles for men and women in relation to war and violence are even more strongly embedded in the culture than general proscriptions concerning gender communication roles. "War talk" is the province of men; military service has historcally excluded women in various forms, and credibility in the public arena is often linked directly to one's war experience. Jean Bethke-Elshtain has observed that passive roles that women are expected to fill during times of war even extends to passivity in articulating their concerns about war (Christensen 1994, p. 16). Elshtain writes: In the matter of women and war we [women] are invited to turn away. War is men's: men are the historic authors and organizers of violence. Yes, women have been drawn in—and they have been required to observe, suffer, cope, mourn, honor, adore, witness, work. But men have done the describing and defining of war (1987, p. 164). During the Persian Gulf War debates in the U.S. Congress, women legislators faced these same constraints. The "service" experience of male counterparts was a significant part of the debate. Women attempted to meet this rhetorical obstacle by illustrating their own connections with war experiences through the men in their lives who had served or by arguing on behalf of their constituents. The necessity of meeting this obstacle with periferal and tenuous connections instead of direct and clear experience certainly weakened the credibility of those women and their impact on the debate. As Christensen points out, "each woman had to face a prejudiced assumption that she was ignorant or incompetent about war simply because this culture defines war as a quintessentially masculine activity" (1994, p. 18). Peterson (1990) and Corgan (1990) make the same point with reference to the describing and defining of war specifically in the Panamanian invasion. Further, there are numerous examples of women's failure to meet the cultural expectations of appropriate normative behavior when engaging in war messages. For example, former congresswoman Bella Abzug was removed from her position as co-chair of the National Advisory Commission for Women in 1979 by then President Jimmy Carter; Carter was outraged that the commission was "using that platform to talk about war and the economy. These, said the president, were not women's issues." (Harris and King 1989, p. 39). When the issue is war (even metaphorically), men understand the social pressures to conform to cultural standards of "war talk" as well. To help control and shape the public persona, men find it necessary to engage in masculine, gender-marked language to avoid perceptions of "being soft" or "reacting like like a woman" In addition to the weight of social and political sanctions in this context, men are also given cultural permission to engage in a type of masculine discourse that might otherwise be considered totally inappropriate. For example, during the Gulf War both public and congressional discourse used "imagery of male sexual domination as a metaphor for what would happen to Iraq and Saddam Hussein. George Bush was reported to have said that he wanted to kick Saddam's ass' [and] after the war began, Representative Gary Ackerman was prompted to exult on the floor of the House, 'Slam, bam, thanks Saddam!'" (Christensen 1994, p. 21). Cohn's work with defense intellectuals and military strategists further illustrates this point when she reported that the ramifications of war policy were not discussed. "Instead, they challenged each other's masculinity and 'shut down' discussion by referring to each other as 'wimp,' 'pussy,' and 'fag'. For weeks at a time, their deliberations were reduced to pondering the question, 'does George Bush have the stones for war?'" (1993, p. 237). The use of gender-marked language reduces women's voices to nothingness [sic] and places them in an untenable rhetorical position, neither participation in nor withdrawal from this discourse will empower women's messages. In the academic debate community, complaints about language and decorum often reflect this same phenomenon. Turnan illustrates by noting an incident at a CEDA National Tournament about which he concludes: "Suffice it to say that the female students and their evidence were subjected to gender specific verbal abuse throughout the debate, elevating to a level which materially affected their ability to proceed or derive education from the experience" Co. 84V We are not arguing here that women and men are fundamentally different in the ways that they relate to war and "war talk". The theoretical positions concerning women as inherently peacemaking and men as inherently warrior-like as opposed to being subjected to normative and linguistic gender roles, is an ongoing argument within the general culture (e.g. Harris and King, 1989). My concern is that because communication educators do understand the power of language choices to shape our understanding and experience, we need to be more careful to recognize the implications these choices have for the health of our communication activities. Using the "war" metaphor so pervasively as the framework within which academic debate takes place, devalues and restricts women's participation and success. The metaphorical choice is to some degree structuring debate in the academic community. The activity is defined at the outset as a male dominated one that employs a rhetoric that is outside the appropriate province of women. Using the "war\*\* metaphor defines issues of ethos clearly along gender lines putting women at a distinct disadvantage. And finally, using the "war" metaphor traps men into the employment of misogynist rhetoric and attitudes to support the building of their own rhetorical legitimacy.

Political spaces such as debate can be transformative – death is inevitable, but there is value in tangible improvements in the human condition AND allows the right to take control over reproductive politics

Brenkman ‘2 (John, Distinguished Professor of English and Comprative Literature at CUNY Graduate Center, Narrative, “Queer Post-Politics”, Volume 10, Issue 2, p. 174-180, Project Muse)

But Edelman interprets this nonrecognition in very different terms from those I have just used. When he asserts that "there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers," he is not making a mere statement of protest; rather, he is announcing the theoretical position that is the explicit stake of his entire argument. I [End Page 175] now want to turn to his theoretical project, which involves an argument in political theory and an argument from psychoanalysis and a link between the two. The Political Theory Argument For Edelman the image of the child-as-future is more than a powerful trope in the political discourse of the moment. It in effect defines the political realm: "For politics, however radical the means by which some of its practitioners seek to effect a more desirable social order, is conservative insofar as it necessarily works to affirm a social order, defining various strategies aimed at actualizing social reality and transmitting it into the future it aims to bequeath to its inner child" (19). The burden of this argument is that a genuinely critical discourse cannot arise via the marking or symbolizing of the gap between the present and the future. Such symbolizing has indeed been the defining feature of modern critical social discourse, whether among the Enlightenment's philosophes, French revolutionaries, Marxists, social democrats, or contemporary socialists and democrats. Jürgen Habermas, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, defines modern time-consciousness itself as a taking of responsibility for the future. Edelman sees in such a time-consciousness an inescapable trap. For him any such political discourse or activity steps into "the logic by which political engagement serves always as the medium for reproducing our social reality" (26). Certainly the political realm—whether viewed from the perspective of the state, the political community and citizenship, or political movements—is a medium of social reproduction, in the sense that it serves the relative continuity of innumerable economic and non-economic institutions. But it is not simply a mechanism of social reproduction; it is also the site and instrument of social change. Nor is it simply the field of existing power relations; it is also the terrain of contestation and compromise. Edelman compounds his reductive concept of the political realm by in turn postulating an ironclad intermeshing of social reproduction and sexual reproduction. Here too he takes a fundamental feature of modern society, or any society, and absolutizes it. Sexual reproduction is a necessary dimension of social reproduction, almost by definition, in the sense that a society's survival depends upon, among many other things, the fact that its members reproduce. Kinship practices, customs, religious authorities, and civil and criminal law variously regulate sexual reproduction. However, that is not to say that the imperatives of social reproduction dictate or determine or fully functionalize the institutions and practices of sexual reproduction. The failure to recognize the relative autonomy of those institutions and practices underestimates how seriously feminism and the gay and lesbian movement have already challenged the norms and institutions of compulsory heterosexuality in our society. They have done so through creative transformations in civil society and everyday life and through cultural initiatives and political and legal reforms. The anti-abortion and anti-gay activism of the Christian Right arose, in response, to alter and reverse the fundamental achievements of these movements. How then to analyze or theorize this struggle? A motif in Edelman's analysis [End Page 176] takes the rhetoric and imagery of the Christian Right and traditional Catholicism to be a more insightful discourse than liberalism when it comes to understanding the underlying politics of sexuality today. I think this is extremely misguided. The Right does not have a truer sense of the social-symbolic order than liberals and radicals; it simply has more reactionary aims and has mobilized with significant effect to impose its phobic and repressive values on civil society and through the state. The Christian Right is itself a "new social movement" that contests the feminist and gay and lesbian social movements. To grant the Right the status of exemplary articulators of "the" social order strikes me as politically self-destructive and theoretically just plain wrong.